Human Judgment in algorithmic loops: Individual justice and automated decision‐making

Reuben Binns

Regulation & Governance, 2022, vol. 16, issue 1, 197-211

Abstract: Arguments in favor of tempering algorithmic decision making with human judgment often appeal to concepts and criteria derived from legal philosophy about the nature of law and legal reasoning, arguing that algorithmic systems cannot satisfy them (but humans can). Such arguments often make implicit appeal to the notion that each case needs to be assessed on its own merits, without comparison to or generalization from previous cases. This article argues that this notion of individual justice can only be meaningfully served through human judgment. It distinguishes individual justice and considers how it relates to other dimensions of justice, namely consistency and fairness / nondiscrimination. Finally, it identifies and discussess two challenges: first, how individual justice can be accommodated alongside other dimensions of justice in the socio‐technical contexts of humans‐in‐the‐loop; and second, how inequities in individual justice may result from an uneven application of human judgment in algorithmic contexts.

Date: 2022
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12358

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:reggov:v:16:y:2022:i:1:p:197-211

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Regulation & Governance from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().