How regulations undervalue occupational fatalities

W Viscusi and Robert J. Cramer

Regulation & Governance, 2023, vol. 17, issue 1, 250-271

Abstract: The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration establishes incentives for safety by setting and enforcing regulatory standards. Using four and a half decades of inspection data, this article provides a comprehensive analysis of the factors underpinning penalties following fatalities. The “fatality premium” for regulatory violations following a worker death is quite modest and is several orders of magnitude below the value‐of‐a‐statistical‐life figure needed to establish efficient levels of deterrence in the absence of all other financial incentives. Although there are low statutory caps on penalties, only 8% of the penalties for violations involving fatalities are constrained by the cap, suggesting that current statutes establish norms for reasonable penalty amounts. In situations involving a fatality at firms with union representation during the inspection, the enforcement sanctions are more stringent. Fatalities involving migrant laborers are less heavily penalized.

Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12445

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:reggov:v:17:y:2023:i:1:p:250-271

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