Guardians and Spenders in the Budgetary Process: More Than One Type of Relations

Ilana Shpaizman

Regulation & Governance, 2025, vol. 19, issue 2, 583-598

Abstract: The budget is the outcome of bargaining between spenders and guardians. Most research on budgeting sees all spenders as a unitary actor. This article argues, instead, that there are different relations at play between guardians and each spending ministry. Based on a comparison between four social ministries in Israel, it shows that these relations differ in terms of the level of involvement of guardians in spenders' budgetary inputs and outputs, ranging from near‐complete autonomy within existing budget limits to tight budgetary control and interference in policymaking. The difference is a function of the perceived risk of overspending or ineffectiveness. When the guardian's level of involvement is high, the dynamic between the parties can be conflictual if they do not share the same policy ideas. In a conflictual dynamic, spenders have more chances of forcing their will on guardians if they can use their political power to stand up to them.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70002

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:reggov:v:19:y:2025:i:2:p:583-598

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