Trade liberalization and the spread of regulatory institutions: The case of Chile

Benedicte Bull

Regulation & Governance, 2007, vol. 1, issue 4, 372-384

Abstract: It is currently widely recognized that trade liberalization leads not only to deregulation but also to re‐regulation. However, it is less well understood how trade agreements and trade liberalization affect domestic regulatory institutions. This article aims to contribute to such an understanding through a case study of Chile. Since 1990, Chile has pursued a strategy of economic integration through bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements. The study shows how this strategy has led to the partial implementation of a patchwork of competing regulatory institutions, many of which can trace their roots to the domestically preferred institutions of Chile’s major trading partners.

Date: 2007
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00022.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:reggov:v:1:y:2007:i:4:p:372-384

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