Regulation by litigation

Bruce Yandle, Andrew Dorchak and Andrew P. Morriss

Regulation & Governance, 2011, vol. 5, issue 2, 241-249

Abstract: We believe that careful application of the logic of economics and public choice shines important light on regulation through litigation and can explain at least partly why regulators choose the litigation route, when they choose it, and how the choice may or may not achieve broad goals of efficiency and fairness. We present three case studies: heavy‐duty diesel engines, silica and asbestos, and the tobacco industry's Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).

Date: 2011
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2011.01103.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:reggov:v:5:y:2011:i:2:p:241-249

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