Regulation by litigation: Not so bad?

William Funk

Regulation & Governance, 2011, vol. 5, issue 2, 275-285

Abstract: This is a review essay concerning the book Regulation by Litigation. Utilizing public choice theory as the basis of its analysis, the book presents three case studies designed to demonstrate that regulation by litigation does not serve the public interest. This review essay attempts to show that public choice theory does not explain the decision to use litigation in these cases, that the alleged failure of litigation in these cases might not be failures at all, and that regulation by litigation is not the unmitigated evil the authors of the book suggest.

Date: 2011
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2011.01104.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:reggov:v:5:y:2011:i:2:p:275-285

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