Different ways of blowing the whistle: Explaining variations in decentralized enforcement in the UK and France

Julien Etienne

Regulation & Governance, 2015, vol. 9, issue 4, 309-324

Abstract: The factors explaining decentralized enforcement – the monitoring and reporting of illegalities in organizations by employees – remain poorly understood. This article contributes to filling this gap by presenting a study of employee reports to regulatory authorities of incidents that have taken place in British and French high hazard industries. The article distinguishes between two different registers of “quiet” and “loud” reporting, reflecting the varying echo of employee reports, as intended either by employees themselves or by other stakeholders. The study finds quiet reporting to be widespread in the UK, while loud reporting was salient in France only. The contrast can be explained by making reference to the relationships between unions, regulators, and managers, and the history and institutions of industrial relations that shaped them in particular ways in each country. The comparison suggests also that whistleblower protection legislation has played little role in encouraging reporting.

Date: 2015
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https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12060

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:reggov:v:9:y:2015:i:4:p:309-324

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