Rivalry under price and quantity uncertainty

Dean Paxson and Helena Pinto

Review of Financial Economics, 2005, vol. 14, issue 3-4, 209-224

Abstract: We present a real option model for a duopoly setting where there are two stochastic factors and where the roles of the players are defined both exogenously and endogenously. The two stochastic factors are the number of units (market volume) and the profit per unit, which may have significantly different drifts and volatilities, and different correlations, depending on market structure and (dis)economies of scale. The paper shows that the degree of correlation between unit profits and market volume might result in different value functions and triggers, especially for followers and simultaneous investors in non‐pre‐emptive games. Monopoly‐like volume is a critical determinant of the leader's trigger in both pre‐emptive and non‐pre‐emptive games. First‐mover advantages are significant in the definition of the leader's optimal entry moment, if the players are fighting for the leader's position (pre‐emptive game).

Date: 2005
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rfe.2005.04.002

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:revfec:v:14:y:2005:i:3-4:p:209-224

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