Who chooses whom? Syndication, skills and reputation

Tereza Tykvova

Review of Financial Economics, 2007, vol. 16, issue 1, 5-28

Abstract: We develop a model focusing on the dynamic aspect of syndication, namely, the know‐how transfer between syndication partners and their ability to learn. The core of the analysis checks whether reputational concerns outweigh the temptation to renege on a given contract. Throughout the paper, we investigate two key topics. The first consists of the conditions under which investors syndicate their deals. The second focuses on who chooses whom. Sometimes, the syndication is impeded because the financier believes that his partner has strong incentives to either renege on a contract (hold‐up problem) or to shirk (moral hazard problem).

Date: 2007
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rfe.2005.10.001

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:revfec:v:16:y:2007:i:1:p:5-28

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