MERGER ACTIVITY AND MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION

John L. Teall

Review of Financial Economics, 1992, vol. 2, issue 1, 55-67

Abstract: A theoretical monopolistic economy is developed to explain relationships between merger activity and managerial compensation packages. In this economy, managers are assigned to and compensated by firms based on models established in “n” person cooperative game theory. Compensation packages offered to managers of potential acquiring firms are studied with respect to their impact on managers' willingness to initiate profitable merger bids. The model explains why overall merger returns decrease as the size of the target firm relative to the bidding firm increases. Model results are consistent with numerous other empirical findings regarding merger profit distributions.

Date: 1992
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1873-5924.1992.tb00556.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:revfec:v:2:y:1992:i:1:p:55-67

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