EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Rendering the Majority Unable

David Mena Alemán

World Affairs, 2016, vol. 179, issue 3, 24-58

Abstract: The Founding Fathers conceived formal counter‐majoritarian restrictions aimed specifically to “render the majority unable”: to prevent the majority from trampling on minorities in the U.S. democratic system. This article contends that several such formal restrictions actually fail to protect contemporary minorities as the founders imagined they would. Indeed, counter‐majority restrictions embedded in the Electoral College, the Senate, and the judicial review may actually prohibit such protection. Using a comparative politics approach, this article builds on theoretical arguments and data that evaluate democratic functionality and fairness based on level of social equality provisions as well as optimality of voter participation. I find that certain counter‐majoritarian procedures are empirically linked to higher inequality levels across twenty‐one advanced democracies. This political suboptimality is reflected in a significant correlation between higher Gini coefficients and majoritarian systems (with the United States in first place) in the sample and also between lower scores and consensus democracies. I argue that comparative analysis shows that some criticisms hitherto only leveled at the United States are present in an entire family of systems—the majoritarian ones—which begs significant critical questioning of the impact of institutional design on the effectiveness of social policies and inclusive democratic procedures.

Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1177/0043820017690049

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:woraff:v:179:y:2016:i:3:p:24-58

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in World Affairs from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:wly:woraff:v:179:y:2016:i:3:p:24-58