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The Madisonian Republic and Modern Nationalist Populism: Democracy and the Rule of Law

Anthony R. Brunello

World Affairs, 2018, vol. 181, issue 2, 106-132

Abstract: The U.S. Federal Constitution was built to be a machine for displacing conflict. Madison and the other Framers erected a Federal Republic organized to control populist movements and preserve the interests of the greatest stakeholders, while offering the “most liberty imaginable” in 1788. In 2016, a populist movement ascended to the commanding heights of power. How did it happen and what are the consequences when a faction comes to power? Is it a defect of the modern structure of American government? Has the U.S. Constitution reached a place where it is no longer functional? Or can Madison's Republic continue to work against popular factions rising in a common passion fired by fear and hatred? In tackling these questions, this article suggests that the U.S. Constitutional Framers did not know in 1788 what exiting the aristocratic and feudal world would mean and what kind of state and society the Republic would become. I argue Madison's contributions to The Federalist are exemplars of the engineer showing how each part of the machine fits together to achieve a comprehensive and effective whole. The national populism of the kind circulating around the Western world in 2016 has posed real challenges to that machinery. Los creadores de la Constitución de los EE. UU. no sabían en 1788 ni lo que significaría el fin del mundo aristocrático y feudal, ni en qué tipo de sociedad y estado se convertiría la República. Había en este acto de creación una oferta milagrosa de los fundamentos de un ideal democrático y constitucional que fluye con los valores del liberalismo, el pluralismo, la libertad y la igualdad, igualmente fundamentados en la misma Ilustración. La constitución federal fue creada para ser una máquina que descarta el conflicto. Madison y los otros creadores fundaron una república federal para controlar los movimientos populistas y preservar los intereses de los afectados más importantes, y al mismo tiempo ofrecer “la mayor libertad imaginable” en 1788. 美国宪法制定者在1788年还不曾知道退出贵族社会和封建社会意味着什么,以及共和国将会成为怎样的国家和社会。在共和国创建的过程中,出现了宪法与民主理想的核心,后者充满了源于启蒙运动的各种价值观,包括自由主义,多元主义,自由和平等。联邦宪法的出台是为了取代冲突。麦迪逊和其他制宪者在1788年建立了联邦共和国,用以控制民粹主义运动,维护最大利益相关者的权益,同时提出了”能想象出的大多数自由”。

Date: 2018
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