Rent Seeking and Insurance Education: An Empirical Test

Gordon D. Johnson, J.J. Launie and G. Michael Phillips

Journal of Insurance Issues, 1987, vol. 10, issue 1, 47-52

Abstract: The market for insurance education functions much as any other market. Where there is excess demand for insurance courses, administrators respond by adding classes. When there is inadequate demand, courses are dropped. With this in mind, insurance education is flourishing at some universities, and languishing at others. This paper describes a simple rent-seeking model which associates the real compensation to insurance professionals with corresponding insurance enrollments.

Date: 1987
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