Board Leadership Structure of Publicly-Traded Insurance Companies
Steve Miller and
Tina Yang
Journal of Insurance Issues, 2015, vol. 38, issue 2, 184-232
Abstract:
CEO duality is a contentious issue driving much debate amongst regulatorsand business leaders. It is also an aspect of corporate governance to which insurancecompanies have made significant changes in recent years. Despite its significance, weknow little about the determinants of CEO duality in the insurance industry and itsimpact on firm performance. This paper addresses these research questions. We findstrong evidence that CEO duality is a complex decision that insurance firms fine-tunein response to their individual circumstances. Compared to other industries, theinsurance industry is unique in that the costs and benefits of CEO duality vary morewith firm size. We find no evidence that CEO duality is detrimental to firm perfor-mance. If anything, the valuation impact of CEO duality appears to be positive for largeinsurers. Our results have important policy implications. Evidence suggests thatregulatory initiatives targeting CEO duality of insurance firms should pay closeattention to the role of firm size. It may also be desirable to promote regulations thatcan provide insurance companies decision flexibility in adjusting their leadershipstructures to competitive environments.
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wri:journl:v:38:y:2015:i:2:p:184-232
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