A Governance Study of Corporate Ownership in the Insurance Industry
David M. Pooser,
Ping Wang and
Journal of Insurance Issues, 2017, vol. 40, issue 1, 23-60
This study focuses on family control and ownership patterns in the U.S. insurance industry. Conflicting theories argue that family firms perform worse due to nepotism and weak riskâ€ bearing attributes (Agency theory) or that family firms perform better because the unity of ownership and control reduces agency expenses (Stewardship theory). Our findings support the Stewardship view of the firm. Our findings also demonstrate that CEOâ€ Chairperson duality improves performance but that the combination of family and duality is subâ€ optimal. We further study implications of institutional investor and insider ownership, compensation structure, and leverage on performance.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wri:journl:v:40:y:2017:i:1:p:23-60
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