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False reputation in social control

Mario Paolucci ()
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Mario Paolucci: IP-CNR, Italian National Research Council, Viale Marx, 15, I-00137 Rome, Italy

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2000, vol. 03, issue 01n04, 39-51

Abstract: A simulation study is conduced on the spread of reputation in mixed respectful-cheater population. The effects of various mechanism giving raise to false reputation are shown, together with a discussion of foreseen results. The actual results of the simulation are then presented; informational accuracy is found to be an essential condition to maintain an advantage for the norms-followers.

Keywords: simulation; norms; information exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219525900000042

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