EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Cooperation in an Adaptive Network

M. G. Zimmermann, V. M. Eguíluz (), M. San Miguel and A. Spadaro
Additional contact information
M. G. Zimmermann: Instituto Mediterráneo de Estudios Avanzados IMEDEA(CSIC-UIB), E07071 Palma de Mallorca, Spain
V. M. Eguíluz: Instituto Mediterráneo de Estudios Avanzados IMEDEA(CSIC-UIB), E07071 Palma de Mallorca, Spain
M. San Miguel: Instituto Mediterráneo de Estudios Avanzados IMEDEA(CSIC-UIB), E07071 Palma de Mallorca, Spain
A. Spadaro: Department of Economics and Business, Universitat de les Illes Balears, E07071 Palma de Mallorca, Spain

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2000, vol. 03, issue 01n04, 283-297

Abstract: We study the dynamics of a set of agents distributed in the nodes of an adaptive network. Each agent plays with all its neighbors a weak prisoner's dilemma collecting a total payoff. We study the case where the network adapts locally depending on the total payoff of the agents. In the parameter regime considered, a steady state is always reached (strategies and network configuration remain stationary), where co-operation is highly enhanced. However, when the adaptability of the network and the incentive for defection are high enough, we show that a slight perturbation of the steady state induces large oscillations (with cascades) in behavior between the nearly all-defectors state and the all-cooperators outcome.

Keywords: Social organisation; Networks; Game theory; Agent based models; Weak Prisoner's Dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219525900000212
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:03:y:2000:i:01n04:n:s0219525900000212

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219525900000212

Access Statistics for this article

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) is currently edited by Frank Schweitzer

More articles in Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:03:y:2000:i:01n04:n:s0219525900000212