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STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN A STYLIZED (SO-CALLEDCHINOS) GUESSING GAME

Luis Pastor-Abia (), José M. Pérez-Jordá, Emilio San-Fabián, Enrique Louis () and Fernando Vega-Redondo ()
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Luis Pastor-Abia: Departamento de Química-Física, Universidad de Alicante, Alicante, Spain
José M. Pérez-Jordá: Departamento de Química-Física, Universidad de Alicante, Alicante, Spain;
Emilio San-Fabián: Departamento de Química-Física, Universidad de Alicante, Alicante, Spain;
Enrique Louis: Departamento Física Aplicada, Universidad de Alicante, Alicante, Spain;
Fernando Vega-Redondo: Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, Universidad de Alicante, Alicante, Spain;

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2001, vol. 04, issue 02n03, 177-190

Abstract: A guessing game very popular in some European countries involves several players hiding in their hands a number of coins (or pebbles) between zero and three, then attempting to guess in turn thetotalnumber of coins in the hands of everyone, with the restriction that no player can repeat the guess issued by any predecessor. After a full round, the player, if any, who guesses correctly wins. Of course, rounds without a winner are also possible, in which case a new round is started afresh. The purpose of the present article is to present an analysis of this game (calledChinosin Spain, as a perturbation of "chinas", i.e. pebbles), and some of its possible variants. Our primary aim is to show its potential to shed light on some issues of strategic behavior and information transmission that seem very germane to some social and economic problems.

Keywords: Information transmission; herding; guessing game; Chinos game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219525901000152

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