REINFORCEMENT LEARNING IN MARKOVIAN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES

V. S. Borkar ()
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V. S. Borkar: School of Technology and Computer Science, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Homi Bhabha Road, Mumbai 400005, India

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2002, vol. 05, issue 01, 55-72

Abstract: A population of agents plays a stochastic dynamic game wherein there is an underlying state process with a Markovian dynamics that also affects their costs. A learning mechanism is proposed which takes into account intertemporal effects and incorporates an explicit process of expectation formation. The agents use this scheme to update their mixed strategies incrementally. The asymptotic behavior of this scheme is captured by an associated ordinary differential equation. Both the formulation and the analysis of the scheme draw upon the theory of reinforcement learning in artificial intelligence.

Keywords: Evolutionary games; stochastic dynamic games; expectation formation; actor-critic methods; reinforcement learning; generalized Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219525902000535

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