NETWORK DEPENDENCE OF STRONG RECIPROCITY

Rui Mendes

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2004, vol. 07, issue 03n04, 357-368

Abstract: Experimental evidence suggests that human decisions involve a mixture of self-interest and internalized social norms which cannot be accounted for by the Nash equilibrium behavior of Homo Economicus. This led to the notion of strong reciprocity (or altruistic punishment) to capture the human trait leading an individual to punish norm violators at a cost to himself. For a population with small autonomous groups with collective monitoring, the interplay of intra- and intergroup dynamics shows this to be an adaptive trait, although not fully invasive of a selfish population. However, the absence of collective monitoring in a larger society changes the evolution dynamics. Clustering seems to be the network parameter that controls maintenance and evolution of the reciprocator trait.

Keywords: Social networks; strong reciprocity; altruistic punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219525904000226

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