CRITICAL BEHAVIOR IN AN EVOLUTIONARY ULTIMATUM GAME WITH SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Víctor M. Eguíluz () and Claudio J. Tessone
Additional contact information
Víctor M. Eguíluz: Instituto de Física Interdisciplinar y Sistemas Complejos IFISC (CSIC-UIB), E-07122 Palma de Mallorca, Spain
Claudio J. Tessone: Instituto de Física Interdisciplinar y Sistemas Complejos IFISC (CSIC-UIB), E-07122 Palma de Mallorca, Spain;

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2009, vol. 12, issue 02, 221-232

Abstract: Experimental studies have shown the ubiquity of altruistic behavior in human societies. The social structure is a fundamental ingredient to understand the degree of altruism displayed by the members of a society, in contrast to individual-based features, like for example age or gender, which have been shown not to be relevant to determine the level of altruistic behavior. We explore an evolutionary model aiming to delve how altruistic behavior is affected by social structure. We investigate the dynamics of interacting individuals playing the Ultimatum Game with their neighbors given by a social network of interaction. We show that a population self-organizes in a critical state where the degree of altruism depends on the topology characterizing the social structure. In general, individuals offering large shares but in turn accepting large shares, are removed from the population. In heterogeneous social networks, individuals offering intermediate shares are strongly selected in contrast to random homogeneous networks where a broad range of offers, below a critical one, is similarly present in the population.

Keywords: Altruistic behavior; social networks; self-organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219525909002179
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:12:y:2009:i:02:n:s0219525909002179

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219525909002179

Access Statistics for this article

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) is currently edited by Frank Schweitzer

More articles in Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().