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MULTI-MARKET MINORITY GAME: BREAKING THE SYMMETRY OF CHOICE

Karol Wawrzyniak () and Wojciech Wislicki ()
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Karol Wawrzyniak: Interdisciplinary Centre for Mathematical and Computational Modelling, University of Warsaw, Pawińskiego 5A, PL-02-106 Warszawa, Poland
Wojciech Wislicki: A. Sołtan Institute for Nuclear Studies, Hoża 69, PL-00-681 Warszawa, Poland

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2009, vol. 12, issue 04n05, 423-437

Abstract: Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step, every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of utility then market occupancies become inhomogeneous with preference given to this market where the fluctuation occurred first. There exists a critical size of agent population above which agents on bigger market behave collectively. In this regime, there always exists a history of decisions for which all agents on a bigger market react identically.

Keywords: Minority game; adaptive system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219525909002313

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