GAME THEORETIC BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS FOR EVACUEES' EXIT SELECTION

Harri Ehtamo, Simo Heliövaara (), Timo Korhonen () and Simo Hostikka
Additional contact information
Harri Ehtamo: Systems Analysis Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland
Simo Heliövaara: Systems Analysis Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland
Timo Korhonen: VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, Finland
Simo Hostikka: VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, Finland

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2010, vol. 13, issue 01, 113-134

Abstract: We present a model for evacuees' exit selection in emergency evacuations. The model is based on the game theoretic concept of best-response dynamics, where each player updates his strategy periodically by reacting optimally to other players' strategies. A fixed point of the system of all players' best-response functions defines a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game. In the model, the players are the evacuees and the strategies are the possible target exits. We present a mathematical formulation for the model and show that the game has a NE with pure strategies. We also analyze different iterative methods for finding the NE and derive an upper bound for the number of iterations needed to find the equilibrium. Numerical simulations are used to analyze the properties of the model.

Keywords: Evacuation simulation; best-response dynamics; exit selection; agent-based modeling; Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S021952591000244X
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:13:y:2010:i:01:n:s021952591000244x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S021952591000244X

Access Statistics for this article

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) is currently edited by Frank Schweitzer

More articles in Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().