A SECURE REVERSION PROTOCOL THAT GENERATES PAY-OFFS DOMINATING REWARDS FROM CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM

Cedric Wanko ()
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Cedric Wanko: LAMETA University Montpellier 1, UFR des Sciences Economiques, Avenue de la Mer CS 79606, Montpellier 34960 Cedex 2, France

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2011, vol. 14, issue 06, 887-904

Abstract: We define the reversion protocol of a voluntarily implementable Bayesian mechanism in which risk-averse players have no incentive to cheat or to deviate from the mediator's recommendation and that can greatly improve their equilibrium expected pay-offs as compared to those generated through coordination applied to the results of an unsatisfactory mediation.

Keywords: Bayesian rationality; correlated equilibrium distribution; reversion; secure protocol (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1142/S021952591100344X

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