LANGUAGE, CATEGORIZATION, AND CONVENTION
Louis Narens (),
Kimberly A. Jameson (),
Natalia L. Komarova () and
Sean Tauber ()
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Louis Narens: Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-5100, USA
Kimberly A. Jameson: Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-5100, USA
Natalia L. Komarova: Department of Mathematics, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697, USA
Sean Tauber: Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-5100, USA
Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2012, vol. 15, issue 03n04, 1-21
Abstract:
Linguistic meaning is a convention. This article investigates how such conventions can arise for color categories in populations of simulated "agents". The method uses concepts from evolutionary game theory: A language game where agents assign names to color patches and is played repeatedly by members of a population. The evolutionary dynamics employed make minimal assumptions about agents' perceptions and learning processes. Through various simulations it is shown that under different kinds of reasonable conditions involving outcomes of individual games, the evolutionary dynamics push populations to stationary equilibria, which can be interpreted as achieving shared population meaning systems. Optimal population agreement for meaning is characterized through a mathematical formula, and the simulations presented reveal that for a wide variety of situations, optimality is achieved.
Keywords: Convention; evolution of meaning; evolutionary game theory; population learning algorithms; color category learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:15:y:2012:i:03n04:n:s0219525911500226
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219525911500226
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