PREFERENTIAL OPPONENT SELECTION IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES

Markus Brede ()
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Markus Brede: School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, University Road, Southampton, Hampshire SO17 1BJ, United Kingdom

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2012, vol. 15, issue 07, 1-14

Abstract: This paper discusses preferential opponent selection in public goods games. It is shown that a preference to play with successful opponents strongly enhances the prevalence of cooperation. The finding is robust on spatial grids and heterogeneous networks. Importantly, I also demonstrate that positive opponent selection biases can evolve and become dominant in initially randomly mixed populations without selection bias.

Keywords: Public goods games; evolutionary game theory; complex networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219525912500749

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