A SIMULATION OF DISAGREEMENT FOR CONTROL OF RATIONAL CHEATING IN PEER REVIEW

Francisco Grimaldo () and Mario Paolucci ()
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Francisco Grimaldo: Departament d'Informàtica, Universitat de València, Av. de la Universitat, s/n, Burjassot, 46100, Spain
Mario Paolucci: Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italian National Research Council, Via Palestro 32, Roma, 00185, Italy

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2013, vol. 16, issue 07, 1-24

Abstract: Understanding the peer review process could help research and shed light on the mechanisms that underlie crowdsourcing. In this paper, we present an agent-based model of peer review built on three entities — the paper, the scientist and the conference. The system is implemented on a BDI platform (Jason) that allows to define a rich model of scoring, evaluating and selecting papers for conferences. Then, we propose a programme committee update mechanism based on disagreement control that is able to remove reviewers applying a strategy aimed to prevent papers better than their own to be accepted ("rational cheating"). We analyze a homogeneous scenario, where all conferences aim to the same level of quality, and a heterogeneous scenario, in which conferences request different qualities, showing how this affects the update mechanism proposed. We also present a first step toward an empirical validation of our model that compares the amount of disagreements found in real conferences with that obtained in our simulations.

Keywords: Artificial social systems; peer review; agent-based simulation; trust reliability and reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219525913500045

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