A NOVEL GAME THEORY BASED EXIT SELECTION MODEL IN EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

Marcello Braglia, Davide Castellano and Roberto Gabbrielli ()
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Marcello Braglia: Dipartimento di Ingegneria Meccanica, Nucleare e della Produzione, Università di Pisa, via Bonanno Pisano 25/b, 56126 Pisa, Italy
Davide Castellano: Dipartimento di Ingegneria Meccanica, Nucleare e della Produzione, Università di Pisa, via Bonanno Pisano 25/b, 56126 Pisa, Italy
Roberto Gabbrielli: Dipartimento di Ingegneria dell'Energia e dei Sistemi, Università di Pisa, largo L. Lazzarino, 56126 Pisa, Italy

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2013, vol. 16, issue 07, 1-35

Abstract: In this paper, a new game theory based approach for the evacuees exit selection in emergency conditions is presented. It is founded on the theoretical concepts of multi-stage games with perfect information. In particular, an evacuee is a player and the available actions for a generic player are the accessible emergency exits. The developed mathematical model involves several psychological parameters, in order to make the emergency exit choice also affected by the individual character. Moreover, an evacuation simulation model incorporating this novel approach is shown. The model involves many other parameters and aspects attempting to obtain a satisfactory representation of the actual evacuation process and of the human behavior in emergency conditions. Finally, the effectiveness of the model is demonstrated with a simulative study.

Keywords: Emergency exit selection; game theory; evacuation simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219525913500185

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