OPTIMAL POLICIES IN TWO-STEP BINARY GAMES UNDER SOCIAL PRESSURE AND LIMITED RESOURCES

Paolo Pellizzari, Elena Sartori and Marco Tolotti
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Elena Sartori: #x2020;Department of Mathematics, Università di Padova, Via Trieste, 63 35121 Padova, Italy

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2015, vol. 18, issue 05n06, 1-16

Abstract: In this paper, we propose a model where binary games with many players are implemented at two subsequent dates. An external authority sets incentives to maximize the gain deriving from the project. We show that the interplay between the optimal participation shares at the two subsequent dates makes the optimal strategy nontrivial and, to some extent, unexpected. As an application, in the context of an insurgence muting into an armed rebellion, we study the emergence of escalation effects when many actors interact taking into account social recognition.

Keywords: Computational techniques; multiple Nash equilibria; riot models; robust decision making; threshold models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219525915500204

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