THE DOSE OF THE THREAT MAKES THE RESISTANCE FOR COOPERATION

Uzay Cetin () and Haluk O. Bingol ()
Additional contact information
Uzay Cetin: Department of Computer Engineering, Boğaziçi University, 34342 Bebek, Istanbul, Turkey
Haluk O. Bingol: Department of Computer Engineering, Boğaziçi University, 34342 Bebek, Istanbul, Turkey

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2016, vol. 19, issue 08, 1-20

Abstract: We propose to reformulate the payoff matrix structure of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) Game, by introducing threat and greed factors, and show their effect on the co-evolution of memory and cooperation. Our findings are as follows. (i) Memory protects cooperation. (ii) To our surprise, greater memory size is unfavorable to evolutionary success when there is no threat. In the absence of threat, subsequent generations lose their memory and are consequently invaded by defectors. (iii) In contrast, the presence of an appropriate level of threat triggers the emergence of a self-protection mechanism for cooperation, which manifests itself as an increase in memory size within subsequent generations. On the evolutionary level, memory size acts like an immune response of the generations against aggressive defection. (iv) Even more extreme threat results again in defection. Our findings boil down to the following: The dose of the threat makes the resistance for cooperation.

Keywords: Cooperation; memory; threat; evolutionary game theory; agent-based modeling; emergence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219525916500156
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:19:y:2016:i:08:n:s0219525916500156

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219525916500156

Access Statistics for this article

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) is currently edited by Frank Schweitzer

More articles in Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().