PERIODIC STRATEGIES II: GENERALIZATIONS AND EXTENSIONS

V. K. Oikonomou () and J. Jost
Additional contact information
V. K. Oikonomou: Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in the Sciences, Inselstrasse 22, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
J. Jost: Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in the Sciences, Inselstrasse 22, 04103 Leipzig, Germany†Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico, USA

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2020, vol. 23, issue 02, 1-29

Abstract: At a mixed Nash equilibrium, the payoff of a player does not depend on her own action, as long as her opponent sticks to his. In a periodic strategy, a concept developed in a previous paper [V. K. Oikonomou and J. Jost, Periodic strategies: A new solution concept and an algorithm for nontrivial strategic form games, Adv. Compl. Syst. 20(5) (2017) 1750009], in contrast, the own payoff does not depend on the opponent’s action. Here, we generalize this to multi-player simultaneous perfect information strategic form games. We show that also in this class of games, there always exists at least one periodic strategy, and we investigate the mathematical properties of such periodic strategies. In addition, we demonstrate that periodic strategies may exist in games with incomplete information; we shall focus on Bayesian games. Moreover, we discuss the differences between the periodic strategies formalism and cooperative game theory. In fact, the periodic strategies are obtained in a purely non-cooperative way, and periodic strategies are as cooperative as the Nash equilibria are. Finally, we incorporate the periodic strategies in an epistemic game theory framework, and discuss several features of this approach.

Keywords: Game theory; alternatives to Nash equilibrium; periodic strategies; rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219525920500058
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:23:y:2020:i:02:n:s0219525920500058

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219525920500058

Access Statistics for this article

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) is currently edited by Frank Schweitzer

More articles in Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().