Balancing Load via Small Coalitions in Selfish Ring Routing Games
Xujin Chen (),
Xiaodong Hu () and
Weidong Ma ()
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Xujin Chen: Institute of Applied Mathematics, AMSS, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, P. R. China
Xiaodong Hu: Institute of Applied Mathematics, AMSS, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, P. R. China
Weidong Ma: Institute of Applied Mathematics, AMSS, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, P. R. China
Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), 2015, vol. 32, issue 01, 1-27
Abstract:
This paper concerns the asymmetric atomic selfish routing game for load balancing in ring networks. In the selfish routing, each player selects a path in the ring network to route one unit traffic between its source and destination nodes, aiming at a minimum maximum link load along its own path. The selfish path selections by individuals ignore the system objective of minimizing the maximum load over all network links. This selfish ring load (SRL) game arises in a wide variety of applications in decentralized network routing, where network performance is often measured by the price of anarchy (PoA), the worst-case ratio between the maximum link loads in an equilibrium routing and an optimal routing. It has been known that the PoA of SRL with respect to classical Nash Equilibrium (NE) cannot be upper bounded by any constant, showing large loss of efficiency at some NE outcome.In an effort to improve the network performance in the SRL game, we generalize the model to so-called SRL with collusion (SRLC) which allows coordination within any coalition of up to k selfish players on the condition that every player of the coalition benefits from the coordination. We prove that, for m-player game on n-node ring, the PoA of SRLC is n - 1 when k ≤ 2, drops to 2 when k = 3 and is at least 1 + 2/m for k ≥ 4. Our study shows that on one hand, the performance of ring networks, in terms of maximum load, benefits significantly from coordination of self-interested players within small-sized coalitions; on the other hand, the equilibrium routing in SRL might not reach global optimum even if any number of players can coordinate.
Keywords: Selfish routing; bottleneck congestion game; load balancing; ring networks; k-strong equilibrium; price of anarchy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1142/S0217595915400035
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