THE STABILITY OF DYNAMIC RENT-SEEKING GAMES

Lin Xu and Ferenc Szidarovszky
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Lin Xu: Systems and Industrial Engineering Department, University of Arizona, Tucson AZ 85721, USA
Ferenc Szidarovszky: Systems and Industrial Engineering Department, University of Arizona, Tucson AZ 85721, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 1999, vol. 01, issue 01, 87-102

Abstract: The asymptotical stability of the equilibrium in dynamic rent-seeking games is examined. Both discrete and continuous time scales are considered. Sufficient, necessary and sufficient stability conditions are derived and then economic interpretations are discussed. Special cases of linear production functions are used to illustrate the conditions.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:01:y:1999:i:01:n:s0219198999000074

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198999000074

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