DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC GAMES OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION BETWEEN PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION

Victor Domansky ()
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Victor Domansky: St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Serpuhovskaya 38, 198013 St. Petersburg, Russia

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 1999, vol. 01, issue 02, 149-158

Abstract: Controlled by several agents, multistage processes of resource allocation between production and consumption with random production functions are considered as non-cooperative dynamic stochastic games. For these games, the Nash Equilibria are constructed satisfying the criteria of maximisation of some kind of "public utility". Both finite and infinite horizons of planning are examined.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198999000104

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