A STOCHASTIC BARGAINING PROCESS AND CORRESPONDING ONE-SHOT SOLUTION CONCEPT

Ferenc Szidarovszky
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Ferenc Szidarovszky: Systems and Industrial Engineering Department, University of Arizona, PO Box 210020 Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 1999, vol. 01, issue 02, 159-168

Abstract: A stochastic bargaining process is first introduced to solve two-person conflicts. The outcome of the process depends on the initial offers of the two players, as well as on the offer-dependent breakdown probabilities. After the convergence (in most cases the finiteness of the process) is verified, a one-shot solution is introduced. The existence of a unique solution is then proven, and its relation to the non-symmetric Nash solution is discussed.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198999000116

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