ON PRE-PLAY NEGOTIATIONS AND ZERO-SUM BETTING

Hovav Perets and Doron Sonsino ()
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Hovav Perets: Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 1999, vol. 01, issue 02, 193-196

Abstract: Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983) have proven the "impossibility of zero-sum betting" in a simple non-strategic model. We study a dynamic game of incomplete information that extends the Sebenius and Geanakoplos framework, and show that the no-betting result carries over to the extended game.

Keywords: Zero-sum betting; pre-play negotiation; JEL classification C72; JEL classification D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198999000141

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