UNIQUE NASH IMPLEMENTATION FOR A CLASS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS

Walter Trockel
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Walter Trockel: Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, P.O. Box 100131, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 1999, vol. 01, issue 03n04, 267-272

Abstract: The paper presents a method of supporting certain solutions of two-person bargaining games by unique Nash equilibria of associated games in strategic form. Among the supported solutions is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198999000190

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