CONGESTION GAMES AND POTENTIALS RECONSIDERED

Mark Voorneveld (), Peter Borm, Freek van Megen, Stef Tijs and Giovanni Facchini
Additional contact information
Mark Voorneveld: Department of Econometrics and Center, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Freek van Megen: Department of Econometrics and Center, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Stef Tijs: Department of Econometrics and Center, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 1999, vol. 01, issue 03n04, 283-299

Abstract: In congestion games, players use facilities from a common pool. The benefit that a player derives from using a facility depends, possibly among other things, on the number of users of this facility. The paper gives an easy alternative proof of the isomorphism between exact potential games and the set of congestion games introduced by Rosenthal (1973). It clarifies the relations between existing models on congestion games, and studies a class of congestion games where the sets of Nash equilibria, strong Nash equilibria and potential-maximising strategies coincide. Particular emphasis is on the computation of potential-maximising strategies.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Congestion Games and Potentials Reconsidered (1999)
Working Paper: Congestion Games and Potentials Reconsidered (1999)
Working Paper: Congestion games and potentials reconsidered (1999)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198999000219

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