NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS

Jean Derks and Hans H. Haller
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Hans H. Haller: Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 1999, vol. 01, issue 03n04, 301-314

Abstract: The paper studies the consequences of the Null Player Out (NPO) property for single-valued solutions on the class of cooperative games in characteristic function form. We allow for variable player populations (supports or carriers). A solution satisfies the NPO property, if elimination of a null player does not affect the payoffs of the other players. Our main emphasis lies on individual values. For linear values satisfying the null player property and a weak symmetry property, necessary and sufficient conditions for the NPO property are derived.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198999000220

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