DOUBLE INVARIANCE: A NEW EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT FOR TWO-PERSON DYNAMIC GAMES

P. Caravani ()
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P. Caravani: Electrical Engineering Department, University of L'Aquila, Monteluco di Roio, 67040 L'Aquila, Italy

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2000, vol. 02, issue 02n03, 193-207

Abstract: Doubly Invariant Equilibrium is introduced as an alternative concept to Nash equilibrium in dynamic games doing away with the notion of a payoff function. A subset of the state space enjoys the invariance property if the state can be kept in it by one player, regardless of the action of the opponent. A doubly invariant equilibrium obtains when each player can make his own subset invariant. Relationships to Nash equilibrium and viability theory are discussed and a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a doubly invariant equilibrium is given for the class of linear discrete-time games with polyhedral constraints on the state and strategy spaces.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198900000093

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