REPEATED PLAY AND NEWTON'S METHOD

Sjur Didrik Flåm ()
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Sjur Didrik Flåm: Economics Department, Bergen University, 5007, Norway

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2000, vol. 02, issue 02n03, 141-154

Abstract: Motivated by repeated play of non-cooperative games, we study equation solving undertaken in parallel by several non-communicating agents, each dealing with his own block of variables. The process is akin to Newton's method in using derivative information. It does, however, proceed without matrix inversion and dispenses with the need to exchange information between various blocks.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198900000111

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