UNILATERAL COMMITMENTS IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES

Ignacio García-Jurado (), Luciano Méndez-Naya () and Fioravante Patrone ()
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Ignacio García-Jurado: Department of Statistics and OR, Faculty of Mathematics, Santiago de Compostela University, 15771 Santiago de Compostela, Spain
Luciano Méndez-Naya: Department of Quantitative Economics, Faculty of Economics, Santiago de Compostela University, 15771 Santiago de Compostela, Spain
Fioravante Patrone: Department of Mathematics, Universita di Genova, via Dodecaneso 35, 16146 Genova, Italy

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2000, vol. 02, issue 02n03, 129-139

Abstract: No abstract received.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198900000147

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