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UNANIMITY IN VOTING FOR VOTERS

Daniel Granot (), Michael Maschler () and Jonathan Shalev ()
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Daniel Granot: Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver BC Canada V6T 1Z2, Canada
Michael Maschler: Department of Mathermatics and the Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2000, vol. 02, issue 02n03, 117-127

Abstract: No abstract received.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198900000159

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International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

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