ON MERGE PROPERTIES OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE

Jean Derks and Stef Tijs
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Stef Tijs: Center and Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2000, vol. 02, issue 04, 249-257

Abstract: Given a transferable utility game, where the players merge into subgroups described by a partition, we address the following question: under which conditions on the characteristic function and partition, merging is beneficial if the Shapley value is applied. Our results can be positioned among the search for well-defined classes of games where merging of players is possible without utility loss in case the Shapley value is chosen as the outcome of the game, and we will report on two of these classes of games arising from telecommunication problems.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: On merge properties of the Shapley value (2000)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198900000214

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