A NON-COOPERATIVE BARGAINING PROCEDURE GENERALISING THE KALAI-SMORODINSKY BARGAINING SOLUTION TO NTU GAMES

Gustavo Bergantiños, Balbina Casas-Méndez () and Margarita Vázquez-Brage
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Balbina Casas-Méndez: Department of Statistics and OR, Faculty of Mathematics, University of Santiago, 15771 Santiago de Compostela, Spain
Margarita Vázquez-Brage: Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Informatics, University of La Coruña, 15071 La Coruña, Spain

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2000, vol. 02, issue 04, 273-286

Abstract: We present a new NTU value, which generalises the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to NTU games using three approaches. In the first section, we define the new NTU value as the only efficient point in the segment defined by an upper and a lower bound. Next, we define a bargaining procedure and prove that this procedure leads to a single, subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vector, which coincides with the new NTU value. Finally, we characterise the new value using several properties.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198900000226

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