COALITION CABINETS IN JAPAN (1993–1997): A GAME THEORY ANALYSIS

Rie Ono and Shigeo Muto
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Rie Ono: Faculty of Economics, Toyama University, 3190 Gofuku, Toyama 930-8555, Japan
Shigeo Muto: Department of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Oh-okayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2001, vol. 03, issue 02n03, 113-125

Abstract: In this paper, we analyse three Japanese coalition cabinets organised since July 1993, by evaluating parties' power for possible alternative cabinets with Owen's coalition value. In these cabinets, certain parties played a crucial role to determine the cabinet coalition structure. The analysis shows that each of these parties made a good decision for itself in terms of the coalition value, and that the value can be a good prediction of party power.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198901000312

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