FORMULATION AND APPLICATIONS OF HIERARCHY GAMES

Mitsutaka Matsumoto ()
Additional contact information
Mitsutaka Matsumoto: Department of Value and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2001, vol. 03, issue 02n03, 189-201

Abstract: In this paper, I discuss the formulation and some applications of a framework called "hierarchy games". Hierarchy games are a game theoretical framework in which two or more games interact with one another. The interaction among games can be best described by the following two characteristics: (1) the outcome of a lower-level game could restrict the available actions of a player in higher-level. (2) the payoff of a higher-level player is shared by lower-level players. The above ideas were first proposed by Hausken in 1995. The paper attempts to develop further those ideas. First, some parts of the framework are defined more rigorously than Hausken's formulation. Secondly, some applications of the framework to the field of International Relations are discussed.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198901000403
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:03:y:2001:i:02n03:n:s0219198901000403

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198901000403

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().