EFFICIENCY IN DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY COMPETITION

Rim Lahmandi-Ayed

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2001, vol. 03, issue 04, 341-350

Abstract: The approach introduced by Gromb, Ponssard and Sevy (GPS) for dynamic entry games provides satisfactory results in the case of price competition but leaves the issue pending for quantity competition. This paper proposes a market attribution rule that restores the desired properties: average cost pricing in the symmetric case and the selection of the most efficient firm when asymmetry is introduced.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198901000440

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