STATIONARY STRATEGIES IN ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC GAMES

J. Flesch, F. Thuijsman and O. J. Vrieze
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J. Flesch: Department of Mathematics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
F. Thuijsman: Department of Mathematics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
O. J. Vrieze: Department of Mathematics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2001, vol. 03, issue 04, 283-290

Abstract: We deal with zero-sum stochastic games. We demonstrate the importance of stationary strategies by showing that stationary strategies are better (in terms of the rewards they guarantee for a player, against any strategy of his opponent) than (1) pure strategies (even history-dependent ones), (2) strategies which may use only a finite number of different mixed actions in any state, and (3) strategies with finite recall. Examples are given to clarify the issues.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198901000464

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