THE DYNAMICS OF THE NASH CORRESPONDENCE ANDn-PLAYER STOCHASTIC GAMES

Eilon Solan ()
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Eilon Solan: Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, USA;

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2001, vol. 03, issue 04, 291-299

Abstract: Aquitting gameis a sequential game where each player has two actions: tocontinueor toquit, and the game continues as long as no player quits.For every continuation payoffxwe assign a one-shot game, where the payoff if everyone continues isx. We study the dynamics of the correspondence that assigns to every continuation payoff the set of equilibrium payoffs in the corresponding one shot game.The study presented here has an implication on the approach one should take in trying to prove, or disprove, the existence of an equilibrium payoff inn-player stochastic games. It also shows that the minimal length of the period of a periodicδ-equilibrium in three-player quitting games needs not be uniformly bounded forδ>0.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198901000488

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